



Transforming DOE Cyber Security

A Science-Based Approach

A report from the grass roots cyber security community

For the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Science

Prepared by:

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What others think . . .

The nation's critical infrastructure, such as the electric power grid, air traffic control system, financial system, and communication networks, depends extensively on information technology for its operation. Concerns about the vulnerability of this infrastructure have heightened in the security-conscious environment...

["Toward a Safer and More Secure Cyberspace,"
The National Academies]

... cheaper and easier to get hold of the tools needed to launch a cybercrime attack [RSA]

"Estonia was a wakeup call... We have to wake up our governments ... If people do not understand the urgency now, they never will."

– Viviane Reding, EU Information Society commissioner

"We haven't implemented information security. We have been securing the perimeter, the moat and castle, but not the king, and information is the king. And like a king, information has a nasty habit of wanting to move around."

– Art Coviello, executive vice president, EMC and president, RSA

"Cyberspace is very important, very insecure and security problems are getting worse. For lots of reasons (economic, public safety, national security) it is very much in the broad public interest to make it safer and more secure." [National Academies]



3 Questions Launched the Community

1. What are the key priorities with regard to cyber security research and development over the next decade?
2. What would we recommend, in terms of a program, to address those priorities?
3. How would a DOE Office of Science program in this area complement other cyber security R&D initiatives such as NSF's or other agency programs?

First Community Workshop

February 11-13, 2008 at Argonne National Laboratory - 44 Participants

PNNL:
Frincke, Thompson

Ames:
Bode, Strasburg

UIUC:
Khurana

ANL:
Caltett, Swietlik, Engert, Rackow,
Volmer, Kwiatkowski, Martin,
North, Poetzel, Skwarek

FNAL:
Altunay, Crawford, Cudzewicz,
Gaines, Petravick

UW:
Endicott-
Popovsky

LBL:
Agarwal,
Draney,
Stone, Lant

LLNL:
Quinlan,
Sommer,
White

SNL:
Talbot,
Vanderveen



BBN:
Goldfarb

DOE:
Polansky

LANL:
VonderWiel,
Wendelberger

SNL:
Armstrong, Berry, Minnich,
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ORNL:
Griffin, Jiao, Wilder,
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
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

Findings⁽¹⁾

- **Need** for investment in proactive long-term approach to Cyber Security.
- DOE has **a unique history** of taking on national priorities that involve long-term, sustained, focused research and development with clear mission-objectives.
- DOE's **science mission** supports operational laboratories, instruments, and other facilities.
- DOE can provide a broad-based **scientific approach** to cyber security through the national laboratory system.

(1) D. Frincke, C. Catlett, F. Siebenlist, E. Talbot, R Strelitz, B. Worley. *Transforming CyberSecurity R&D within the DOE: Getting ahead of the threat*, Technical Report 0001 from the DOE cybersecurity grass roots community.

A Science-Based Approach:

- Move away from:
 - Largely reactive
 - Short term investments in engineered term solutions
 - Catch-n-patch
 - Policy- > audit- > find- > fix- > repeat
- Move towards:
 - Emphasize the proactive
 - Long term, visionary, transformational
 - Provable, testable
 - Quantifiable



Put the fire out

Install fire suppression sprinklers ...

Intrinsically fireproof buildings



Collaboration is KEY!



Our discussions, teleconferences, Town Hall meeting, and paper development are products of 40+ creative and dedicated individuals from:

- Ames Laboratory
- Argonne National Laboratory
- BBN Technologies
- U.S. Department of Energy
- National Energy Research Scientific Computing Center
- Sandia National Laboratories
- Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
- University of Washington
- Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory
- Invensys
- Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
- Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
- Los Alamos National Laboratory
- University of Illinois at Champaign/Urbana
- Oak Ridge National Laboratory
- Colorado State University




Goals and Objectives

“We will enable the DOE mission by transforming the ability of domain scientists to work safely, despite the need to operate within an insecure cyber-world.”

- Advancing the state of the science
- Open Source and transparent
- Solicit high-level direction from the classified communities for their long term benefit.
- Strive for long-term and high-risk research directions
- Identify short-term payoffs
- Remain aware of and responsive to shifts in the industry and use of technology
- Be threat-agnostic
- Strive for benefits beyond the DOE missions
- Actively foster collaboration with commercial academia, and other government communities


Time Line



Currently planning "approximately April Town Hall Meeting




What if . . .





Changing the Game



Ahead of the Threat

Predicting the actions of an adversary

Computer Science	Rapid integration and parsing of heterogeneous, very large scale data sets	Simulation/modeling (consequences)	Collaborative situational awareness	Data pedigree	Pairwise gene similarity computation
Mathematics	Network tomography; Very large graphs; scale free networks	Matrix/tensor methods for criticality	Byzantine agreement	Game theory	Risk analysis and reliability theory Dempster-Schaefer evidence equations
Computer Hardware	Verifiably correct/secure hardware components	Policy/privacy aware sensors for hostile environments	Secure and performance-sensitive command/control systems	Secure multicore systems	Integrity for very large scale file systems

Ahead of the Threat

Self Healing and Resilient Systems



Computer Science

Rapid integration and parsing of heterogeneous, very large scale data sets

Simulation/modeling (consequences)

Collaborative situational awareness

Data pedigree

Pairwise gene similarity computation

Mathematics

Network tomography; Very large graphs; scale free networks

Matrix/tensor methods for criticality

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Game theory

Risk analysis and reliability theory
Dempster-Schaefer evidence equations

Computer Hardware

Verifiably correct/secure hardware components

Policy/privacy aware sensors for hostile environments

Secure and performance-sensitive command/control systems

Secure multicore systems

Integrity for very large scale file systems



Documents and Writings

- Document: Transforming Cyber Security
 - What are the key priorities with regard to cyber security research and development over the next decade?
 - What would we recommend, in terms of a program, to address those priorities?
 - How would a DOE Office of Science program in this area complement other cyber security R&D initiatives such as NSF's or other agency programs?
- White papers and demonstrations: in progress
- Call coming "soon": Special Edition Journal
- Wiki: in use by the community



Numerous participants helped write *Transforming CyberSecurity!*

- Section 1: *Science-based Cyber Security Research Priorities for the Next Decade*
 - F. Siebenlist (ANL), C. Catlett (ANL), D. Frincke (PNNL), E. Talbot (SNL), D. Petravik (FNL), T. Bartoletti (LLNL)
 - Section 2: *Structure and Components*
 - R. Strelitz (LANL), E. Talbot (SNL), D. Frincke (PNL), C. Catlett (ANL), M. McQueen (INL)
 - Section 3: *Overview of Synergistic Programs and Research Directions for the Department of Energy*
 - B. Worley (ORNL), C. Matarazzo (LLNL), Frincke (PNNL), T. Thompson (PNNL)
- Deb Agarwal, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
 - Mine Altunay, Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory
 - Robert Armstrong, Sandia National Laboratories (CA)
 - Tony Bartoletti, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
 - Patrick Burns, Colorado State University
 - Charlie Catlett, Argonne National Laboratory
 - Matt Crawford, Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory
 - Susan Estrada, Aldea
 - Ian Foster, Argonne National Laboratory
 - Deborah Frincke, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
 - Mark Kaletka, Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory
 - Celeste Matarazzo, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
 - Miles McQueen, Idaho National Laboratory
 - Leonard Napolitano, Sandia National Laboratories (CA)
 - Don Petravick, Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory
 - Anne Schur, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
 - Frank Siebenlist, Argonne National Laboratory
 - Mike Skwerak, Argonne National Laboratory
 - Joe St Sauver, University of Oregon
 - Richard Strelitz, Los Alamos National Laboratory
 - Craig Swietlik, Argonne National Laboratory
 - Edward Talbot, Sandia National Laboratories (CA)
 - Troy Thompson, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
 - Keith Vanderveen, Sandia National Laboratories (CA)
 - Brian Worley, Oak Ridge National Laboratory




Recommendations from *Transforming CyberSecurity:*

- Section 1: *Science-based Cyber Security Research Priorities for the Next Decade*
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- R&D:
 - Open science security architecture for an exascale future
 - Multi-layer security understanding, awareness and response
 - Human aspects/factors & federated trust
 - Intrinsically secure control of critical systems
- Structure and components
 - Matrix not pipeline
 - Broad science base
 - Balance needs of open science with secrecy

Nine White Papers Underway


(authors & discussion participants)



- Complete *Transforming CyberSecurity*
- A Compelling Demo: Bios
 - Ron Minnich (SNL)
- Chronology
 - Chris Strasburg (Ames), Craig Lant (NERSC), Brent Draney (LBL), J D Fluckiger (PNNL)
- Classified Community
 - Brian Worley (ORNL), Chris Griffin (ORNL), Irwin Gaines (Fermi)
- Computer Science Challenges
 - Rob Armstrong (SNL) ; Chris Griffin (ORNL), Ron Minnich (SNL), Mine Altunay (Fermi)
 - Dan Chavarria (PNNL)
- Deming Metaphor
 - Barbara Endicott-Popovsky (U Wash); Don Petravick (Fermi); Frank Siebenlist (ANL)
- Mathematical Underpinnings
 - Joanne Wendelberger (LANL), Ed Talbot (Sandia), Louis Wilder (Oak Ridge), Yu Jiao Tamara (Oak Ridge), Kolda (Sandia)
 - Juan Meza (LBL), Deb Agarwal (LBL), Chad Scherrer (PNNL)
- Practical Answers
 - Matt Crawford (Fermi), Mine Altunay (Fermi), Barb Endicott-Popovsky (U Wash), Anne Schur (PNNL) ; Kirk Bailey (U Wash)
- Socratic and Thematic Approaches
 - Ed Talbot (SNL), Irwin Gaines (Fermi), Richard Strelitz (LANL), Troy Thompson (PNNL)



DOE Cyber Security R&D





Findings from *Transforming CyberSecurity*

- **Need** for investment in proactive long-term approach to cyber security
- DOE has a unique history of taking on national priorities that involve long-term, sustained, focused research and development with **clear mission-objectives**
- DOE's **science mission** is unique in that it directly supports operational laboratories, instruments, and other facilities.
- ***DOE can provide a broad based scientific approach*** to cyber security through the national laboratory system.



On the Horizon for the community


- Planning an open science program with broadly vetted science underpinnings to provide a strong foundation upon which to build operational cyber security policies and capabilities.
- Continuing to incorporate considerations for both the open science initiative, power grid and control systems, and the classified needs of the DOE.
- Workshops over the next several months continue to identify R&D priorities in terms of near- and long-term timeframes, resulting in a 10+ year roadmap.

Interactions among open, classified, power grid etc communities

R&D uniqueness and integration with OGAs, academia, industry

What might a funded program look like?

In Less Time Than We Have Spent Today



Source: <http://www.caida.org/research/security/sapphire/>



Questions?

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Ed Talbot

Ebtalbo@sandia.gov


Brian Worley

Worley@ornl.gov



Supplementary Slides

Additional detail available upon request.



Town Hall Meeting: More Details on R&D Areas (not in priority order)

Data Integrity, Availability, & Provenance

- bit error rate as measure?
- pedigree (who & how)
- multiple administrative domains

Automated Screening of Software

- dynamic & static analysis
- computational & brute force
- binary, source, runtime

Defendable networks

- Forensically-ready networks
- anomaly/intrusion detection
 - active response,
 - incident data sharing
- policy-based monitoring
- Cooperative detection/mitigation, automation

Secure Open Platform

- chipset, bios, OS, architecture
- Collaboration w/ COTS vendors

Measuring Security

- Collaboration w/ OGAs
- future operational context
- units
- dimensionality (confidentiality, availability, integrity...)
- data mining
- risk (QMU)
- Deming QA




System Securability

- Definitions/Taxonomy
- Trusted system out of untrusted components
- Trust & Trust Management
- Human Factors


Security Containers

- Virtualization
- Controlling Complexity

Mathematical Approaches



Visualizing a collection of transmission system lines



Incoming data processed to infer observations

Observations processed to infer indicators

Indicators assessed to gauge threat

Discover and associate actions that fit a malicious exploit profile

Complicated Security Requirements!

ESNET (Fall, 2006)

